Corporate accountability (CA) legitimises and thus reinforces the current system of surplus value extraction. Accountability struggles effectively to reduce corporate capitalism's violence to the good corporate citizen's occasional 'wrongdoing', which becomes a calculable risk capable of being exchanged-signifying 'planned impunity'. CA, though a seemingly emancipatory process, thus exemplifies law's constitutive role in capitalism and the need to move beyond law for emancipation.
conditions.
11 Privatisation, too, is starting to attract negative attention. Broader sections of the public have become suspicious of private contractors such as Blackwater (now Xe), Veolia and G4S, people understand some wars to be fought for corporate profit, and the US 'prison-industrial complex' (in the UK, privately-run immigration detention) is receiving wider condemnation.
12
Bigger questions are being asked-by a so far small but vocal number of activist-critics-about the desirability and ultimate sustainability of corporate capitalism per se. Respectable 'centrist' activists in the US have challenged corporate campaign-funding, as well as the right of corporations to refuse employees elements of medical insurance on religious grounds. 13 When
Volkswagen (a 'trustworthy' company) was found to have been cheating environmentally-conscious consumers, this troubled a significant section of the western middle class. 14 The increasing distrust of large corporations has led to the growth of 'buy local' and 'small, independent', fair trade and organic 'locally grown' movements. 15 At the same time, it has also triggered 'legitimacy recovery' efforts on the part of corporate capitalism. In this essay, I take these legitimacy backlashes seriously. My specific focus is the emergence of the debate on corporate accountability (CA). 16 CA is generally understood to refer to efforts to force corporations to account for (explain, justify, excuse, compensate, make good) the negative effects of corporate activity on its 'victims' and the public at large. The methods employed include 'self-accounting'-through or with the help of various NGOs, lawyers, media, activists, states and international bodies, corporate-produced corporate social 11 'EU Tax: Tough Love for Multinationals' Sweetheart Deals', Financial Times, 13 July 2015, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/32e6a5c4-1a80-11e5-a130-2e7db721f996.html#axzz3n1j1vTkE (last visited 21 December 2015).
12 See, e.g., the work of CorporateWatch in the UK, available at https://corporatewatch.org (last visited 11 November 2015). responsibility (CSR) programmes, drawing up voluntary guidelines, standards, creating schemes for compliance, monitoring or (self-)certification, working with Public Relations officers and the media on corporate image, and so on. It also includes the work of states and courts in legally regulating, permitting selfregulation, prosecuting or threatening to prosecute, subjecting to licensing and other bureaucratic procedures, and a variety of actors in advocating and lobbying for or participating in negotiations around CA instruments and policies. CA in this sense is thought of as a vital method of restraining corporate activity, limiting wrongdoing and reducing negative effects of corporate profit-making activities. I propose that CA also has a second, closely-related meaning. This meaning is based on Weber's literal understanding of 'accountability' as the ability to account the cost/benefit effects of certain events and processes. The exact value of CA work in the ordinary sense can be calculated-it is, in principle, possible to relate the money spent on CSR consultants, CSR projects and gestures, fees for certification, advertising and PR, lobbying, legal fees defending CA cases or indeed spying on and suing anti-corporate activists, and so on, 17 to a specific set of effects on company share prices, brand value, and goodwill. 18 My key argument here is that rather than thinking of CA as restraining corporate value-extracting activity, we should think of it as facilitating corporate profit-making and corporate capitalism as a whole. Corporate reputational risk becomes calculable through the ability to account-to predict, know, and thus manage, manipulate, exchange or 'bank on' future events, relations or dynamics-through 'investment' in CA efforts, which has (adds) value in itself. Secondly, and most significantly, CA work, in shaping how we think of, feel about, and deal with the corporation, as well as what we expect from it, has a legitimising effect, the value of which to the corporation and corporate capitalism more generally, is not directly calculable: it is 'priceless'.
In the first section of this article, I describe how the corporation was created as a legal structure to function as the surplus-value extracting motor of capitalism. I comment on its main elements and the main movements in its creation, the notion of corporate legal personality, limited liability and the profit mandate. As the corporation is created as an 'amoral calculator' and 'externalising machine', the question arises, 'why do we put up with it all'? 19 The answer lies in the creation of corporate ideology legitimising this structure. I discuss this in the second section, which addresses corporate ideology production predominantly through CA in the form of corporate citizenship and CSR. I discuss CSR's material and intellectual provenance and its development into a movement for the promotion of non-binding rules on corporate behaviour.
In the third section, I consider CA 'cause lawyering' and the multiple attempts by NGOs and 'cause-lawyers' to 'hold corporations to account' in western domestic courts. 20 Such cause lawyering, I argue, forms a civil society response to the CSR movement, which, in turn, has sought to alleviate accusations of bad corporate conduct by the cause lawyers. 21 This dynamic then produces the call for the legalisation of CSR, which seeks to form a compromise between the first two responses and has advocates in the corporate and NGO/ practice worlds, as well as in academia. 22 One particular demand often expressed by the 'legalised CSR' advocates is the inclusion of corporate criminal liability in international law or the formation of a specific field of 'corporate international criminal law'. In the final section, I underscore the distributive effects of the CA tools created within these strategies. Most importantly, I show that the contribution CA makes to the reification/anthropomorphisation of the corporation changes ('spirits away' 23 ) the relationship of responsibility for harm from a relationship between individual and affected communities or society at large, to one between individual victims and 'the corporation'. The practical effect of this is that individuals affected by the particular excesses of capitalism (normally in the Global South) are constituted as victims who, in a legal relationship as formal equals with the corporation, can seek to negotiate the 'price' of the harm done to them, under the commodified responsibility relationship, where 'planned impunity' 24 thus furthers contemporary imperialism.
'Calculable' value is created in the specific internal mechanism of CA, namely that of channelling difficult-to-predict risk to business (the potential repercussions of suffering produced by capitalism) into calculable avenues of exchange between the corporation and individual victims. Finally, and importantly, the broader effect of the availability of accountability mechanisms (whether used or not) is that of absorbing a large chunk of the critiques of capitalism and grassroots anti-capitalist resistance into a struggle where capitalism's violence is reduced to 'corporate wrongdoing' and where, once accountability mechanisms exist, the backlash is reversed and the corporation and thus capitalism are 'fixed'. 25 CA thus serves, I argue, as an illustration of the commodity form theory of law's central claim regarding law's emancipatory potential. It shows, the essay concludes, how capitalist law generates seemingly emancipatory discourses and practices that, on closer inspection, turn out to follow the logic of capitalism itself.
A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y A N D T H E C R E A T I O N O F T H E C O R P O R A T E S T R U C T U R E A S T H E M O T O R O F C A P I T A L I S M
While up to the mid-20th century the genealogy of the corporate form was a common topic of conversation among lawyers and scholars, 27 it has now been written out of the main company law textbooks, leaving the corporation as an unquestioned 'natural' fact of life. 28 A second look at the material/social origins of this concept or 'technology of law' is, however, illuminating when considering the value of CA. The creation of the corporate form with its now-common elements also necessitated the creation of a corporate ideology, which facilitated the almost ubiquitous acceptance of the British/US model as the main legal form for business. Corporate ideology creates a narrative for the acceptance of the personification of capital as the main means through which humans are treated as commodities and surplus value is extracted-'Monsieur le Capital' driving the corporate vehicle as the motor of capitalism.
29
The modern corporation originates in the transition to capitalism and the creation of market society in Europe, at a time when capitalism reorganised the provision of everyday wants and labour power was commodified. In its earliest mystical conception, the corporate concept was employed for the personification of a certain type of power, and for the organisation of responsibility. From incorporated boroughs and guilds through to the famous Case of Sutton's Hospital, 30 the concept was then developed in the English courts in response to the expansionary demands of the capitalist and the emerging entrepreneurial middle classes.
31
Weber's concept of rational accounting enables us to understand the relation between law, business and responsibility. For capitalism to function, accountability was needed, meaning that an entrepreneur had to be able to predict and calculate the value of every element of his business, including opportunity and risk, and including the cost of averting such risk. Double-entry bookkeeping enabled accountability, and the ability to see (and to some extent decide) which profits or losses could be ascribed to whom, and, importantly, which risk/cost could be externalised to broader society and the environment. Weber explains how rational commerce (i.e. capitalist exchange) was the field where 'quantitative reckoning' first appeared. For as long as business was carried out by family firms, as a 'closed family affair', 'accountability was . . . unnecessary'; 32 but in the transition to capitalism it became essential. From an arrangement based on blood and trust, we gradually move to a formal legal relationship called a 'trust' (or indeed a 'partnership' or 'corporation'). Calculable law allows the business unit to base its decisions not on moral considerations, but on economic rationality. Responsibility becomes accountability when responsibility becomes a commodified concept with a pricetag, available for exchange. The corporation becomes an 'amoral calculator' 34 and the corporate construct allows/forces its human operators to be the same. Here we see the genealogy of the notion of accountability in this literal sense at the core of the early legal form of the corporation. Bringing in outside capital, and consequently opening up a public market for company shares was the next big development for the legal concept of the corporation. One of the best known of the early corporations was the British East India Company (BEI Co), which raised money from the general public, thus socialising the risk of a potentially disastrous venture. At the same time, the BEI Co and companies like it, functioned as a vehicle for the global spread of capitalist law and was part of what enabled the metropole's capitalists' primitive accumulation, the slave trade and the subjection of three quarters of the world to Western European capitalist interest. Share trade became very popular, and the public literally 'bought into' capitalism enthusiastically. When the share craze around the South Sea Company and others led to a spectacular burst, revealing a web of deceit and corruption involving members of the Government and Royal Household, the 1720 Bubble Act (which, amongst other things, restricted public incorporation but was rumoured to have been put forward by South Sea company directors to root out competition) did not stem this enthusiasm. 35 Lawyers created Joint Stock Company equivalents through contract-'deed of settlement' companies, and stockjobbers proliferated, setting up street stalls selling penny shares in companies for 'importing jackasses from Spain', 'securing perpetual motion', or 'an undertaking which would in due time be revealed'. 36 Their trade, in the face of healthy scepticism towards morally, 37 can be seen as testament to the growing strength and popular acceptance of corporate ideology developing already at this point. Projectors (as those designing such companies for investment were known) feigned public interest 38 and at the same time public ownership of corporations meant that 'everyone' was interested in the corporation's thriving. 'Social capital' thus conversely makes the enterprise appear as a 'social enterprise'.
39
The South Sea bubble share-craze had, by advancing links between the various financial markets in Western Europe, 'facilitated, for the first time, the emergence of an integrated and efficient international financial market'. 40 This development led to the courts reconceptualising the company share no longer as a share in the actual assets of the corporation, but as a financial interest in company profits (and a return on winding up), and shareholders not as partners or lenders but as pure money capitalists, as 'investors'. 41 This supported the idea that shareholders were divorced from the actual goings-on in a company-not liable for, nor indeed perhaps interested in, actions of the company beyond the maximum effective extraction of surplus value. This move contributes to the corporation's nature as an 'amoral calculator'. The first modern companies act, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 properly adopted the deed of settlement company, endowing it with all the key characteristics of the corporation except limited liability. The Act included a provision affirming the pursuit of profit as the proper purpose of the corporation, as well as a right of incorporation (rather than a privilege bestowed by the Crown). 42 Limited liability had been accepted by the courts and was subsequently provided for by statute in 1855. 43 Both the legal nature of the share and limited liability then 'personified' the company as a separate legal entity from the shareholders, a new legal subject, 'capital personified'. 44 
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'Limited' liability in fact shifted liability (or the financial cost of 'failure') to unsecured creditors, who, in turn, were able to rely on their own liability being limited, and who also started to gain protection through the development of insolvency laws. Ultimately, the liability (cost) beyond the limit is socialised over broader society and the natural environment. This, and the socialisation of shareholding as a factor in the legitimisation of the narrow profit mandate ('shareholder primacy' 48 ), serves to render the corporation a 'structure of irresponsibility ', 49 which is 'capitalism congealed' or 'capital personified' and which serves to conceal (and, of course, enrich) the individual businessperson and remove the investor to an arm's-length distance. In the 20th and 21st centuries, we have seen corporate groups form even more sophisticated structures (multinational corporate groups, enmeshed in global value chains) that can isolate and shift value, risk and responsibility on the global level while continuing global accumulation of wealth and the exploitation of Third World labour much like its joint stock forbearer.
In sum, the creation of the legal construct of the modern corporation replaced the forms of communal burden-sharing of the pre-industrial economy during the transition to capitalism, and enabled the accumulation of wealth by the rising middle class and consequently the industrial revolution. As such, it formed an integral part of the creation of the modern capitalist system in existence today. The formal legal concept of the corporation with separate legal personality was created in order to exclude as much as possible the individual as a legally relevant agent in a specific context, to externalise individuals' responsibility by hiving off risk and displacing potential liability, and to render 'accountable' (calculable and plausible) and exchangeable that which is not externalised. This construction makes the corporation capitalism's main motor.
50
The corporate form, the company as an 'amoral calculator' 51 induces its individual operatives to make 'economically rational', arm's-length, amoral decisions-a form of capitalist anomie. 52 The fact that the corporation's history is now rarely discussed, its characteristics rarely questioned, that it is taken as given, precisely maintains this anomie. The modern corporation as 'the end of history' in economic organisation 53 continues to produce knowledge, policy and legal decisions and instruments, that self-perpetuate capitalism and reproduce current socio-economic hierarchies. This ideological achievement is the key source of corporate power. Maintaining this power in the face of intermittent attack, did, however, mean that the corporation, as the reification of capital, 'Monsieur le Capital', the corporate 'psychopath' 54 would require some humanisation.
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Glasbeek has called CSR the 'last maginot line of capitalism', which it has 'dug' in the face of the latest remaining resistance to its main bearer, the corporation. 56 The first resistance to the corporation, as discussed above, was overcome through reification, normalisation, and buy-in to corporate capitalism, and, in the 20th century, corporate ideology continued to develop as part of capitalist ideology more generally. The humanisation of 'Monsieur le Capital', corporate citizenship, the CSR industry and corporate legal accountability are corporate ideology tools created in response to backlashes against the legitimacy of the corporate form and profit-making activities. In Europe and the US, the growing power of large monopoly corporations and cartels caused public concern in the first two decades of the 20th century while the depression of the 1930s caused another backlash, this time against the system of free enterprise itself. 19th-century reification then had to be followed by the creation of the corporate soul, to portray the corporation as a 'good citizen'-'institution in the service of mankind' rather than 'amoral calculator'. 57 In 1908, the US telecommunications giant AT&T was one of the first to launch an advertising campaign aimed at getting the public to 'love and hold affection for' the corporation. US historian Roland Marchand has evocatively described how corporate ideology was reconstructed when the major US corporations used advertising and, later, in-house public relations officers and even iconic architecture, to portray themselves as benevolent and socially responsible.
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Moreover, in the 1930s, crisis corporations started to address the public as voters rather than 'just' buyers, positioning themselves alongside the state as benevolent providers of public goods in what was the 'best strategy . . . to restore people's faith in corporations and reverse their growing fascination with big government'. 59 A parallel development to the creation of the corporate soul is the pinpointing of a 'body to kick' and emerging ideas around corporate crime in the first half of the 20th century. 60 The 'obvious' involvement of the major German corporations in WWII had led to the prosecution of a number of individual German company directors but not the corporations per se-although this possibility had been discussed. 61 Any more fundamental critique of corporate capitalism was staved off by the Allies' realisation of their dependence on the major manufacturers for future war efforts. Instead, the major US corporations were given key roles in rebuilding war-ravaged Europe, allowing them to demonstrate public service and 'good neighbourliness'. 62 Complaints from this point onwards were no longer fundamental challenges to the corporation but rather focused on the 'corporate excess' and 'abuse' of 'bad apples'. Wormser's demand that the Frankensteinian corporate monster was to be made to respect its maker 63 seemed to have been satisfied, at least ostensibly. In legal scholarship the debate centred on the corporation's objective, with CSR and 'corporate citizenship' advocates arguing that the corporation's mandate is (or should be) wider than simple maximisation of shareholder return: that it should act for the benefit of other 'stakeholders' (workers, local communities, etc.), though doing so may also be, and indeed normally is, profitable. Although the profit/shareholder return objective had, in English law, just been introduced in 1844 as the only lawful objective for the corporation, in the 1883 case of Hutton v West Cork Railway Co the court held that a company board could make a decision that at first sight went against shareholders' interests. This would be lawful when the decision indirectly makes business sense: '[t]he law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the company.' 64 While CSR entails a calculation as to its value for the company, the ideological move this allows is to highlight the 'generous' provision of 'cakes and ales', for example, to workers or the local community, while the corporate benefit of such provision-pacifying workers and thereby reducing risk of industrial action or other loss of productivity-remains hidden. As Marchand surmises, corporations create their soul, making us believe they are serving humanity, while in fact they serve capital 65 -a move that law permits and masks.
The 1930s Harvard Law Review debate between Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd on the proper purpose of the corporation 66 in this light appears moot, or climate. In the economically more secure US of the 1950s, the economist Milton Friedman in 1952 again floated the idea that any managerial concern with interests outside of shareholder interests reduces social wealth due to increased agency cost. 67 Friedman revived the 'just business' model dismissed in the 1920s, asking whether it should not rather be up to the state to set the rules on, for example, wages, the environment, and other 'stakeholder' issues, and that businessmen could not presume to know, and that it is not their task to decide, what is best for society in general. 68 The debate in the US and UK rests for now on the 'enlightened shareholder model', which allows attention to stakeholders to be seen as a generous gesture or progressive move. 69 In particular, the currently popular notion of 'shared value' communicates the possibility of a win-win resolution for society and corporate capitalism, even if it is acknowledged to be important that the discussion continue so as to offer a space for concerns over corporate activity to be aired, and discontent to be absorbed. 70 This is an important achievement of/for the 'CSR industry' which can be ascribed to the dialectical development between popular concerns over corporate activity and the realisation that this presents a lucrative business opportunity as well as a vital value-creating legitimising process (regardless of whether one lives up to it). 71 The responsibility for this can even be shifted these developments indicate that today corporate criminal liability in international law is increasingly accepted. In many jurisdictions including the UK, the laws necessary for corporate legal accountability already exist. British NGO Traidcraft in a recent report noted that the problem is that the political will to enforce these norms is lacking. The solution offered is a new legal framework-and at first glance this seems illogical considering the political will required to pass (and indeed enforce) such new laws. Traidcraft's report also notes that directors of 69 per cent of UK companies agree that companies should be accountable for harms caused abroad. 91 Viewed in light of the dia/panlectical development of corporate ideology as described in this section, however, this makes sense. Following Joel Bakan, who has argued that corporations participate in CSR processes in order to shape the narrative and ensure that any resulting private regulation regimes are optimally calibrated to business interests, 92 we could argue that the engagement in advocating and negotiating legal changes is likewise an effort to 'control the field' and possibly even erode existing legal standards or change liability models or enforcement policies with similar effect. 93 Shamir has argued that a corporate conscience, or 'soul' had to be constructed-the corporation had to be 'remoralised', in order for self-regulation to be viewed as a legitimate mechanism. 94 Likewise, by extension, it is corporate right (corporate good citizenship), which creates corporate wrong/crime and, dialectically, vice versa: CA creates the 'good corporation'. 95 CA thus equals 'commodified morality' or 'moral' behaviour with a clear economic benefit. The value of this dynamic is the legitimation of the corporation as the main surplus-value extracting mechanism-but also, as a 'good corporate citizen', as an actor in global governance with an as yet undefined mandate-as an enthusiastic participant in all important global fora, from Davos to Paris for COP21. In the next section, I set out how CA cause lawyering inadvertently contributes to this.
C A C A U S E L A W Y E R I N G
In recent years, the focus of those raising concerns about corporations has shifted largely to the Global South-possibly because a 'kinder capitalism' at home has limited, or concealed from scrutiny, 'corporate excess' in the metropole, and because western corporations have a global reach not seen since the BEI Co. 96 CA cause lawyers have mostly worked on these, rather than western 122 We can see the dialectic at work here between legitimacy challenge and legitimacy reproduction, as these cases generated a significant amount of discovery and media coverage of corporate 'crimes' and 'human rights abuses'-which in turn has spurred on corporate CSR development and the current call for legalised CSR/corporate ICL.
L E G A L I S E D C S R , C A C A U S E L A W Y E R I N G A N D C O R P O R A T E I C L P R O B L E M A T I S E D
Just as it was argued in the 1940s that international human rights law would only 'make sense' if there is a way to hold individuals to account for violations, which became ICL, (global) corporate citizenship now only 'makes sense' when it is linked to the possibility to hold corporations to account in ICL. Subjection to corporate ICL validates the moralisation of M. Le Capital, and completes the process of CSR. Here I comment on the value, as part of corporate ideology, of CSR and corporate ICL, as generated through the work of cause lawyers as well as the proponents of legalised CSR. Although the CA efforts discussed here have many positive effects, not least the vastly increased public knowledge of corporate activities globally, I argue here that the strategies are part of the problem along four axes. I first look at compliance and class, then enforcement and imperialism. I then comment on cause lawyering as the reproduction of white privilege, before discussing the idea of a 'market for responsibility'-which is where corporate ICL, CSR and cause lawyering potentially meet. I conclude on corporate power, legitimacy and the logic of law.
Corporate crime, compliance and class
A preliminary critique of the development of a 'corporate ICL' or Wirtschaftsvölkerstrafrecht 123 is that it excludes business actors from a general legal regime on the basis that they are sui generis and should thus have their own set of rules and enforcement policies. Additionally, the mere existence of a corporate crime rule inevitably removes the focus from individual business(wo)men and thus contributes to the reification of the corporation 'emptied of individuals'-further facilitating the relative risk-free extraction of surplus value by the protected owners of the means of production. The main lesson from English law is that 'corporate crime', despite having been 'on the books' for decades, has not been used to prosecute corporations except in a small number of cases. 124 On the domestic level, under neo-liberal regimes, rather than enforcement/punishment models, compliance models of corporate regulation are predominant. 125 This is a function of corporate economic power and common class interest among business and legal/political elites. For this reason, there is likely only to be a semantic/ideological difference between existing voluntary and any new legally-binding norms as the latter are unlikely to be enforced with much rigour. Nevertheless, the mere existence of binding CSR/corporate ICL combined with a 'compliance culture' has the power to deflate the complaint of 'corporate impunity'. Building, and invoking a compliance culture has two main effects described (in the domestic context) by Hawkins, Snider, Slapper and Pearce and Tombs in the 'punishment model versus compliance school debate' of the early 1990s. 126 The first is that a corporation can shield itself from criminal liability by adopting programmes that provide technical compliance while not actually reducing the incidence of crime, and the so-called 'due diligence defence' could be invoked (by arguing managers had followed protocol) to ward off the risk of a finding of noncompliance. The second is the class-effect. The Afrimex case exemplifies how CSR (specifically, the adoption of a CSR policy or document) can function to insulate against a finding of violation of the OECD Norms.
127 From this it is not difficult to imagine how CA court litigation may be decided in a similar way: companies show readiness to cooperate by emphasising their CSR policies, promise to adopt such policies, etc. This would prove pivotal as grounds for dismissing the claim. The UN Special Rapporteur on Business & Human Rights has defined the 'responsibility to respect' human rights as 'in essence mean[ing,] to act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others'. 128 Legalised CSR, which would likely be based on the Guiding Principles, 129 would have the same effect as domestic corporate crime law. Due diligence works through the delegation of responsibility: each lower level employee has her/specific task list and has received training on compliance and has to sign off on compliance on tasks. This constitutes a 'compliance system' put in place by a senior manager (who has thus acted with due diligence) such that all aberrant results are the result of worker deviance. 130 This means that, even with corporate ICL, the most likely target of enforcement action (if any) is an individual low-ranking worker. As such, corporate responsibility/liability immunises the corporation itself and the directors and managers by shifting the blame to the workers. Compliance, especially, certified compliance, obviates corporate 'command responsibility'. 131 Here we see how capital works to protect itself (preserve value) seemingly in the face of mechanisms formulated to restrain it-amounting to 'planned impunity' for the corporate 'structure of irresponsibility'. Thus, it is no longer hard to see why British businesses would support the change to a due diligence, or 'failure to prevent' liability model.
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Should legalised CSR or corporate ICL be enforced (beyond worker discipline) in an exceptional case, a financial penalty, or indeed any penalty that in a practical sense translates into a financial penalty (e.g., revoking the licence of a 'blood diamond' trader) will likely be accounted for by raising prices of products or services, cutting workers' numbers, pay or conditions, or cutting expenditure on, say, measures to decrease the corporation's negative effects on the environment. 133 As such punishment of the corporation is 'socialised' like any other risk, and may lead to the (collective) punishment of workers or external parties. Nader described in the 1970s how corporations can opt to pay a fine rather than employ technology to conform to safety or environmental regulation, if the latter is more costly. 134 The key barrier to 'effectiveness' of sanctions in the sense normally used in criminal law is that a sanction would not change the rational basis for corporate decision-making, nor the individuals that made the relevant decisions, but the burden of compliance would affect the global working class. 135 CA here maintains and reproduces, with renewed legitimacy, the value-extracting rationale of the corporation and corporate capitalism.
Enforcement and imperialism
Craig Forcese has described CSR as only being necessary because Third World countries, with 'underdeveloped legal systems' are simply not able to write and enforce their own rules for corporate behaviour. 136 In his view, such countries may moreover have 'oppressive leaders' making it even more necessary for developed country multinationals to seek (voluntarily) to set standards of good behaviour. Forcese suggests that CSR could be 'administered' by the international investment dispute resolution mechanisms, and/or by means of 'smart sanctions'. 137 Such language clearly echoes that of international law's 'civilising mission', the export of 'western' law through IFIs, and ICL as a tool for intervention.
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It is well known that the shift of most manufacturing and extraction industries to the Global South suits business due to lower costs (as a result of factors such as low wages and less stringent regulation or enforcement), and where the 'crimes' are not normally visible to us, and the victims are not known to western publics. With increased CA and public scrutiny, however, the risk of brand name damage as a result of a 'scandal' is real. It is exactly that brand value that enables a story to be spun that the scandal is the fault of an, at most, 'badly chosen' subcontractor rather than a result of supply chain power distribution and price squeeze.
If we combine this with Forcese's point (or attitude) above, we can see how corporate crime, warded off by the adoption of CSR compliance programmes, may create a distinction between 'civilised' western-based multinational corporations on the one hand, and 'cowboy' host-state companies on the other. Legalised CSR creates the possibility of selective enforcement against 'uncivilised' corporations, to 'level the playing field', 139 or eliminate that which 'by its unpopularity poisons the pond in which we all must all fish'.
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An example of potentially 'imperialist ICL' is the OSI pillage litigation project, which aims to intervene in the (mainly) African context of conflict resources. It could become the paragon of pro-business use of ICL if it activates the proposals aimed at regulating the natural resource market in the conflict zones of Africa so as to enable prosecution of 'rogue' traders and miners connected to armed groups, thus enabling international corporations to mine and trade without the (costly) 'blood diamond' label. 141 In sum, legalised CSR and
Corporate ICL appear to be deployed particularly in order to facilitate 137 Ibid 283.
138 Baars (forthcoming).
continued value extraction particularly by metropolitan corporations, and thus the continued exploitation of mostly third world workers.
Cause lawyering as the domestication of class struggle and reproduction of white privilege
If we look at the matter from the point of view of those engaged in legal practice, we can see that in recent decades the promise of ICL has turned civil rights and criminal defence lawyers into lawyers seeking criminal prosecution. The romantic ideal of the civil rights movement, of 'little people and landmark decisions', 142 of 'speaking law to power' has-in the context of ICL, turned lawyers to voicing traditionally statist claims for order and control through criminal law. Viewed through a Marxist theoretical lense, such cause lawyering might be seen as a form of resistance or class struggle, as a tactical 'principled opportunism' 143 that may be successful when it coincides with 'judicial activism'.
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Although these attempts do amount to resistance, they are not emancipatory, and their (unintended) effect is rather, on one hand, to domesticate class struggle, and on the other, to actualise, legitimate, and strengthen the existing structures of power and, thus value extraction. 145 CA cause lawyering, based on extraterritorial claims and CSR legalised by means of a treaty, 'lifts' corporate behaviour out of local host-state jurisdictions and potential local control (the locality of the harm and thus the affected persons) into a de facto Western capitalist realm of international normativity. In particular, compensation claims and settlements create an exchange relationship where the 'victim' sells her right and the corporate offender calculates risk. 146 We thus have a situation of 'calculable law' where value is created for the corporation and corporate capitalism through predictability or risk, as well as, and more so, through the ideological effect of the existence and operation of an accountability mechanism (even if partial or selective). The active agent in actualising the legal relationship between the individual 'victim' and the corporation is the cause-lawyer him/herself. While human rights claims are 'claims for admittance to law', 147 the role of lawyers persuading people to bring cases in (western) foreign courts is in some way the equivalent of 'spreading capitalist law' (as part of the civilising or capitalising mission) as done by the corporate colonisers in the 19th century. 148 In order for a claim to be valid and recognised, the human being must become a legal subject, she must articulate her needs, grievances and desires in legal vocabulary and in a western courtroom, through the mouth of (usually) a white man. 149 She must 'join the system' in the same way that 'decolonised' peoples had to join the western state system and European international law. As a western lawyer I may think I am the enabler, the empowering medium in this equation, but in fact I am the opposite, as I produce (constitute) the 'victim' 150 and demand her surrender to my expertise, to become a rights-entrepreneur. 151 I, the white lawyer claim to speak for the oppressed, for justice, but I speak for capitalism, as its enforcer. 152 Thus, inadvertently, such cause lawyers come to create value for the corporation/corporate capitalism-extracted from those on whom the suffering has been inflicted as well as (often) the natural environment, and barely 'compensated', if at all.
Settlements and selling rights: a market for responsibility
Through the lens of the commodity form theory of law, compensation claims and settlements create an exchange relationship where the 'victim' sells her right and the corporate offender calculates the risk (price). 153 The corporate decisionmaker gets to calculate the benefit of the violation (e.g., conflict diamonds are likely to be cheaper than 'clean' diamonds), the chance that those affected will speak out or find (or be found by) a human rights organisation (or UN appointed expert), the chance that they will commence litigation, the chance a court will keep the case going for a few years while the human rights NGO publicises the issue, the expected drop in sales and or share price, and lawyers' fees, in the process of determining whether, finally, to come to a settlement. The decision whether to cause the harm has a calculable price tag. For the 'victim', the need or desire to be free of injury becomes a 'right' which can be worth investing in through, for example, lawyers' fees or time away from regular productive labour, in return for a calculable chance of success. What is my price? For what sum will I relinquish all further claims? Victim and violator negotiate as formal legal equals.
The question arises why business(wo)men would settle such cases at all if the record shows that the likelihood of the petitioners winning in court is next to nil. 154 To analogise Michael Sfard, who asks a similar question in the context of anti-occupation cause lawyering in the Israeli courts, such settlements are beneficial to the company both directly, as it allows them to look generous and recover from bad press as well as to get claimants to sign statements relinquishing future claims, and indirectly, as it 'supplies the oxygen' of the system of capitalism itself, helping to render it sustainable and legitimate.
155
The essence of my critique here is that ATS and similar cases (including, potentially, legalised CSR and corporate liability in ICL with mainly financial penalties or penalties that can ultimately be converted into a mere financial penalty 156 ) turn the 'international crime' from a problem of international society into a problem between the individual victim (or group) and a powerful 'fictional' economic entity in a powerful state-a quantifiable problem if it is 'settled' or receives a financial penalty. 157 However, criminal fines could partially be allocated to victims, meaning that a successful criminal conviction, should such occur, would 'yield' the same result as a successful civil complaint. For example, in December 2011, Trafigura was convicted in a Dutch court of having concealed the dangerous nature of the waste aboard the Probo Koala ship. The company's fine was decreased by the court to E1m because the company had set up a compensation fund for victims. 158 This 'solution'
serves to take the 'victim' out of the picture as an agent and merely positions her as a recipient of goodwill gestures from the corporation. 159 Subsequent cases, filed in The Netherlands, France and the UK, seeking compensation for the harm to thousands of Ivory Coast citizens affected by toxic waste dumped from Trafigura's ship, resulted in dismissals and out-of-court settlements. 160 CA commodifies the 'right' of the individual to be protected from crime (to remain free from harm); the individual is forced to sell by means of a material and (thus) power differential. I say forced, because the situation is comparable to 'free' labour and may be necessary for survival just as a third world employee cannot walk out on a situation where her rights are being abused. As such, the rights/crimes paradigm is liberalism's essence: in global governance, it is each individual's own responsibility to 'valorize' or to claim (negotiate, exchange) her right: claim your prize! Responsibility for violating a right (causing harm) only exists insofar as (and to the value of) the right (which is) claimed: accountability is achieved. By participating in the efforts to legalise CSR and to create the possibility for corporate ICL, corporations are not just turning a bad situation into a profitable one, but at the same time, they are again owning the process, 'controlling the field'. It is noteworthy that the breakdown of participants at the 4th UN Annual Forum on Business & Human Rights' is as follows: 32 per cent NGOs, 22 per cent business, 12 per cent government. 161 The result is, the creation of a corporate ideology of 'canned morality'-the dispensing of commodified moral disapproval in order to conceal the transactions that lie below the surface of CA. The most important transaction is paying off the victims that have been created and placed into a relation of exchange, which results in a return to a balanced account, and to innocence. This transaction has then also concealed the structure, the broader effects on society and the natural environment, beyond that individual victim. This means that 'canned morality' is deployed to achieve precisely the opposite of what it is said to achieve, namely, liability is socialised, shifted to wider society and the natural environment. This move legitimises the corporation, all corporations, and corporate capitalism itself. This is allowed to occur, because, as Berle has suggested, accountability (canned morality applied to corporations) in the 'mainstream' sense responds to a demand, and on a deeper level, to expectations of democracy. Generally the link between accountability and legitimacy is as old as the separation of powers, the rule of law, and democracy itself. Yet, 'canned morality' is as far away from democracy as we can get.
Corporate power, legitimacy and law
On the domestic level, Glasbeek has argued, corporate criminal responsibility was a 'major response developed by law-makers trying to put their fingers in the dyke holding back the flood of illegitimacy threatening to drown the corporate form'. 162 Having corporate criminal liability 'on the books' can be highly valuable for use against scapegoats or bad apples. Such liability is conceived as states' residual sovereign right to control its (or punish others') corporations. Augenstein argues (the majority CA-engaged civil society point) that CA must be seen instead as the obligation on home-states to provide Third World victims with a right of redress. 165 However this vision still depends on global power elites to grant and fulfil that right-which will only rarely be in their interest. Further, it depends on a vision of law as an unqualified good, operating autonomously from power/capital according to a logic of (social) justice, which, I hope to have shown, it does not. Finally, the UK government was the first in the world to publish its 'Action Plan' in fulfilment of its obligations to implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the purpose of which it summarises as follows:
. 'helping to protect and enhance a company's reputation and brand value'; . 'protecting and increasing the customer base, as consumers increasingly seek out companies with higher ethical standards'; . 'helping companies attract and retain good staff, contributing to lower rates of staff turnover and higher productivity, and increasing employee motivation'; . 'reducing risks to operational continuity resulting from conflict inside the company itself (strikes and other labour disputes), or with the local community or other parties (social licence to operate)'; . 'reducing the risk of litigation for human rights abuses'; . 'appealing to institutional investors, including pension funds, who are increasingly taking ethical, including human rights, factors into account in their investment decisions'; . 'helping companies to become a partner/investor of choice for other businesses or governments that are concerned to avoid human rights risks'. This summary is remarkable for at least three reasons. First, it seems wholly and brashly premised on the 'business case', addressing business as its main audience, signifying the primacy of capital. Secondly, 'victims' or those affected by abuses of British corporations abroad 167 are entirely absent, and third, taken as a whole, this statement signifies the effectivity or 'confidence' of corporate capitalism in its legitimacy, such that only a modicum of 'canned morality' is required for acceptance. The effect of responsibilisation here is therefore not a tighter connection between acts and consequences, or accountability (in its common understanding), but rather an ideological achievement, namely the development of intuitive comfort with the current logic of empathy redistribution. 168 Corporate legitimacy has become calculably 'cheap'-or rather-cheaply produced with a large profit margin.
The dark side of CA Although CA efforts may occasionally serve to restrain business involvement in conflict or improve the situation of persons affected by such involvement, added together they are only cosmetic changes on the surface of ongoing corporate-led human and environmental exploitation. 169 They are significant cosmetic changes in that they, in fact, function to sustain our illusion of the possibility, forever deferred, of systemic change through law. They are contextualised truth-telling functions as a tactic of mystification. 170 Human rights law, ICL, and so on, thus serve as a 'ruse to perpetuate class rule'. 171 While here I have focused on CA, by other means we reduce the room for legal manoeuvre in the states hosting our FDI and providing the workers that sow our garments and extract the resources we 'dispossess' from them. 172 The effect of these efforts is, on the one hand, to domesticate class struggle, and on the other, to actualise, legitimate and thus strengthen the existing structures of power. 173 All that is challenged and allowed to pass without sanction, is implicitly declared time, the contradiction inherent in this situation, the cracks in the bond, is that such legally-constructed 'irresponsibility' (planned impunity) contributes to the anarchy of capitalism, which will inevitably lead it to its collapse. 180 This, together with the global 99 per cent's growing consciousness-the active factor in the coming revolution-is the 'seed of the new'.
C O N S C I O U S N E S S -B U I L D I N G A N D T H E S E E D O F T H E N E W
Human Rights Watch Director Kenneth Roth relates the origin of 'corporate ICL' as something that developed through systemic forces rather than (or, despite) his/civil society agency:
Out of the blue, we came up with the concept of complicity. It is very interesting watching it evolve into a criminal concept, because that was not what we had in mind at all. . . .
[I]t is a remote possibility that corporations will actually be charged . . . Further, we do not get involved in tort litigation . . . . The way we enforce rights is, in a sense, by appealing to peoples' [sic] moral sense of what is right and wrong and building up that popular sentiment as a source of pressure on the actor concerned, whether it is a government or a rebel force or, in this case, a corporation. 181 It would seem that the move Roth describes needs to be reversed. Recently, in particular, in the context of the 'Occupy Wall Street' movement, activism directed against corporate personhood has come to the fore. 182 However, the point is not (just) to get rid of corporate personhood or to realise/remember that there are human individuals behind the corporate shield. The point is not then to seek to prosecute those individuals-the point is to realise that the property owning classes (the global capitalist class) are employing the law in this way, to enable exploitation, 'shift' or sell risk, and protect themselves as individuals, and create the ideology that means we put up with it all. As the foundational norm of law is the legal ownership of private property, however, law cannot but function in this way, and our resistance must turn against the concept of private property, against capitalism and against law: away from legal emancipation and toward human emancipation 183 and the creation of alternative forms of organising, producing and distributing. 184 The global capitalist class rule, to a significant degree, through and with the corporate form, which 'hides the essential brutality and indifference to the plight of others that characterises [corporate] profit-making activities'. 185 Their 'corporate rule', is not only material, but also ideological 186 -the corporation rules with a 'combination of force and guile'. 187 The two depend on, and mutually reinforce each other. If the corporation is indeed the motor of capitalism, corporate 'excesses' are the visible manifestations of capitalism's 'dark side'-or, conversely, the corporation is singled out as the author of capitalism's 'excesses'. Corporations, as capitalism's visible persona, 'capital personified' become the pars pro toto taking the hit for the team, for capitalism as a whole. There is value not only to the corporation itself, but to the system of capitalism more broadly in creating, repairing and maintaining the corporation's reputation, its standing, as the 'face' of capitalism. I have examined the labour that goes into maintaining that value, and translating human and environmental damage into quantifiable, and exchangeable risk. While the corporation takes the hit for capitalism, the converse is that once the corporation is 'fixed', and rendered accountable, this immunises (temporarily) the broader structures of capitalism from critique. When our critique of capitalism and our activism mainly extend to creating avenues for or instances of CA, we inadvertently strengthen, rather than restrain, capitalism. Our labour then creates value for capitalism.
Let us instead work towards the world we really want to live in.
